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RECENT DECISIONS
son unless an emergency exists which makes the curtailment of the
right necessary, or unless he is so acting that he is violating the rights
of others, or gives indication that he will violate the rights of others,
or that he is breaking or will break some valid law.
In the instant case there was no showing of an emergency, nor was
there any showing that the defendants were violating the rights of
others or that they were violating any valid laws. Therefore it is the
opinion of the writer that the ordanance in the instant case is not a valid
exercise of the police power because it violates the right of the individ-
ual to move about freely without interrogation by police as to his pur-
pose when conducting himself in an orderly manner, without violating
the rights of others, or violating any valid law.
EMIL SE3ETIC
Labor Law -Financial Contribution by Employer to Union as Un-
fair Labor Practice - In the midst of negotiations for a new contract
between the defendant union and the employer, the proprietor of a
small beauty shop employing four employees, the defendant demanded
that the employer join the union as a non-voting or non-active member.
When he refused to do so the defendant began peacefully to picket his
place of business, whereupon the employer applied to the Wisconsin
Employment Relations Board for relief. The Board found the defen-
dant guilty of an unfair labor practice under the Wisconsin Employment
Peace Act and instituted the present suit for an injunction to enforce
their order that the union cease picketing. Held: Section 111.06(1) (b),
Wisconsin Statutes, defines as an unfair labor practice employer contri-
bution of financial support to any labor organization, and though it
is true that the term "financial support" is much broader than the
mere payment of dues and includes financial support of any kind, it
also includes the payment of dues. Picketing an employer to compel
him to do that which the law prohibits him from doing is not con-
stitutionally protected free speech and may be enjoined. Wisconsin
Employment Relations Board v. Journeymen Barbers Union, 256 Wis.
77, 39 N. W. (2d) 725 (1949).
In Senn v. Tile Layers Protective Union: the United States Su-
preme Court held that there is no absolute federal constitutional right
of an individual to work with his hands, and that a state statute might
authorize or permit the union to picket his shop to make him stop doing
so in order to spread employment of union members. And in Cafeteria
Employees Union v. Angelos2 they determined that a state court may
1 301 U.S. 468, 57 S.Ct. 857, 81 L.Ed. 1229 (1937).
2320 U.S. 293, 64 S.Ct. 126, 88 L.Ed. 58 (1943).
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not enjoin a union from picketing to coerce the owners of a cafeteria
employing no help to join the union.3 Since the decision in the Angelos
case there have been various and conflicting state court decisions
on almost identical fact situations,4 and at least two courts 5. pointed
out that the "union"' was not really a union at all but merely an asso-
ciation of proprietors of one man businesses trying to force their hours
and prices on others, an objective outweighed by the public interest in
free competition.
If there is confusion in the situation involving the one man busi-
ness, is it any wonder that there is in the situation involved in the
principal case. Here the individual picketed is more than merely an-
other worker out on his own. He has, by hiring others6 to aid him,
crossed the line of normal distinction between two economic classes,
and has become an employer, though still retaining many of the char-
acteristics of his former status. It is in this area, this Never-Never
Land of labor disputes, that the traditional concepts of labor law be-
come rather difficult to apply and, once applied, are sometimes hard
to justify and reconcile. The right of a man to work with his hands
to make a living must be balanced with the right of the union to seek
better conditions for its members and protect their gains against those
who have no regard for the legitimate ends of unionism. When the
barbers' union, an international organization, changed its constitution
to require employer-workers to become non-active members of the
union, cases arose in at least two other states 7 on precisely the same
3 It might be pointed out that in that case there was no statute involved declar-
ing the picketing an unfair labor practice. The result might have been dif-
ferent if there had been such a statute in view of the decision in Giboney v.
Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 69 S.Ct. 684. (1949), that picketing
may not be used as "an essential part of a grave offense against an important
public law." See also 1 Baylor L.R. 455 (1949). Wisconsin Statutes, 103.535
provides that it shall be unlawful for anyone to picket the establishment of
anyone engaged in business where there is no labor dispute as defined in
103.62 (3), wherein a labor dispute is defined as any controversy between an
employer and the majority of his employees. The above provisions would
seem to govern the fact situation in the Angelos case. However, the consti-
tutionality of such a statute has been questioned in view of the decision in
American Federation of Labor v. Swing, 312 U.S. 321, 61 S.Ct. 568, 85 L.Ed.
855; see 42 Wis. L.R. 115 (1942).4 Accord with the Angels case, Coons v. Journeymen Barbers, 222 Minn. 100,
23 N.W. (2d) 345, 18 LRRM 2084 (1946); Kellar v. Sun, 93 N.Y.S. (2d) 165,
25 LRRM 2044 (1949) : contra, Bautista v. Jones, 25 Cal. (2d) 746, 155 P. (2d)
343 (1949); Saveall v. Demers, 322 Mass. 70, 76 N.E. (2d) 12, 21 LRRM
2180 (1947); Hanke v. Teamsters Union, - Wash. (2d) -, 207 P. (2d) 206,
24 LRRM 219 (1949).
5 Saveall v. Demers, and Hanke v. Teamsters Union, supra, note 4.
6 The complainant in this case employed four persons but in shops of this kind
the number is often only one. This is pointed out by the Court in the instant
case at p. 84.
7 Riviello v. Journeyman Barbers (Cal. Dist. Crt. of Appeals), 88 C.A.(2d) 499,
199 P.(2d) 400, 23 LRRM 2120 (1948); Foutts v. Barbers Union (Ohio,
Common Pleas), 88 N.E. (2d) 317, 25 LRRM 2180 (1949).
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facts as in the principal case, both of which clearly recognized as a
legitimate labor objeftive the right of a union to picket the employer-
worker to compel him to join their organization, but both of which
enjoined the picketing on widely divergent.reasoning s
The decision of the Court in the instant case was based solely upon
statutory interpretation and involved no considerations of policy other
than those considered by the legislature when it passed the Wisconsin
Employment Peace Act. But it is a serious question as to whether
an act, apparently designed to meet the needs of large scale industry,
should be resorted to in order to find an answer for the situation dis-
closed by the principal case. The intent of the Legislature discernable
from a reading of Section 111.06 (1) (b) appears to have been to
prevent the domination of a union by an employer in order to safe-
guard the absolute freedom of association of the employees and to en-
able the union to maintain its bargaining power as a true representative
of the employees free of the influence of the employer.9 And though
at first blush the decision here appears to go beyond that purpose and
to stretch the literal language of the statute out of its context because
the amount of "financial support" involved is so small, 0 yet is was,
as the Court pointed out, large when viewed percentagewise, and for
the employer involved constituted twenty per cent of the total amount
originating within his place of business. If his employees are to have
true autonomy it would seem that twenty per cent of the financial back-
ing of their union cannot come from their employer."- And yet is it
the main purpose of a union of semi-independent craftsmen to bargain
with their employers in the sense that large industrial unions bargain
with theirs? It would hardly seem so. On the contrary the interests
of the employer are almost the same as those of his few employees
8 California decided that to coerce the barber-employer to join the union as a
non-active member, a membership sterile of all rights save that of paying dues,
was discriminatory and hence violative of the public policy of California;
while Ohio reached the strange conclusion that the removal of the union card
from the premises of the employer was "constructive force."
9 At least that is the result that the National Labor Relations Board came to
in their interpretation of Section 8 (a) (2) of the National Labor Relations
Act, 29 U.S.C.A. 158 (a) (2), which is substantially similar to Section 111.06
(1) (b) of the Wisconsin Statutes, the section under discussion. In re Radio
Corporation of America, 63 N.L.R.B. 55, 16 LRRM 311 (1943) held that it is
merely evidence of the company dominated nature of a union to be financially
supported by the employer, and the mere fact that the employer contributed
something to the union was not of itself the "support" contemplated by the
National Labor Relations Act where the union appeared to have established
itself as "a free and untrammeled bargaining agent." See also Teller, Labor
Disputes and Collective Bargaining, Sec. 297 (1940).
20 Appellant union even claimed that the rule of de minimus non curat lex was
applicable.
11 In the case of the shop retaining the services of only one employee, the per
cent of financial support originating with the employer would seem quite




since he does the same work as those whom he employs.12 In fact an
organization of men whose labor is personal service sold directly to the
public, rather than directly to the employer who in turn sells the pro-
duct of their labor to the public as in a manufacturing plant, is more
like as association of semi-professional men than a labor union.13 This
common interest between employer and employee becomes of less and
less importance as the number of employees is increased and the at-
tention of the owner of the shop is increasingly directed more to the
running of the shop than to the rendition of personal service by him-
self. Yet the test of the Wisconsin Supreme Court here as to the per
cent of union support attributable directly to the employer also grows
less and less pertinent as the number of employees is increased. And
so it would appear that as their interests become more dissimilar, and
hence the need for the protection of the Wisconsin Employment Peace
Act greater, there is increasingly less reason to invoke the prohibition
of Section 111.06 (1) (b). This case discloses the need for legislation
more pertinent to the specialized relation of the independent and semi-
independent craftsmen, comprising so large a part of our laboring class.
They have been neglected in the present statute, fashioned primarily
to meet the needs of others.
WILLIAM S. PFANKUCH
Corporations - Non-Delegable Powers of Board of Directors - The
directors of two corporations considered it in the best interests of both
for defendant Carlisle to obtain 80% or more of Dart's outstanding
stock by an exchange of defendant's stock for Dart's stock. They
caused the two corporations to enter into an agreement whereby de-
fendant promised to make available shares of its stock in exchange for
shares of Dart's "on the basis of such number of shares of Carlisle
for each 1 share of Dart as may be determined to be fair and equitable
by an independent appraiser to be designated by Carlisle, provided,
however, that such exchange shall not exceed a maximum of 218 shares
of Carlisle for each 1 share of Dart." The rest of the agreement bound
defendant irrevocably to issue, but neither Dart or its stockholders
bound themselves to accept, up to 174,400 shares of defendant's stock.
12 The similarity of those interests was used by the appellant union as one of
the reasons why the employer should be amenable to the coercion of the union
by means of peaceful picketing, so as to require him to share in the expense
of furthering those common interests; ". . . the working employer enjoys
many benefits as a journeyman which were obtained only by unceasing and
costly struggles of the . . . union. The prices he can get for his services, the
regulated training under apprenticeship laws, the beneficent legislation regu-
lating the trade and entrance to the trade.. ."; p. 80 of the principal case.
13 As pointed out above the courts of at least two states have come to the same
conclusion; supra note 5.
[Vol. 3
